Abstract. We consider the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, which is a unit-demand auction where each bidder receives an item that maximizes his utility, and the goal is to maximize the auctioneer's profit. This problem is NP-hard and unlikely to be in APX. We present four new MIP formulations for it and experimentally compare them to a previous one due to Shioda, Tunçel, and Myklebust. We describe three models to generate different random instances for general unit-demand auctions, that we designed for the computational experiments. Each model has a nice economic interpretation. Aiming approximation results, we consider the variant of the problem where the item prices are restricted to be chosen from a geometric series, and prove that an optimal solution for this variant has value that is a fraction (depending on the series used) of the optimal value of the original problem. So this variant is also unlikely to be in APX.
Introduction
A part of mechanism design is devoted to profit maximization. The fundamental problem of maximizing profit while selling multiple items to consumers has been vastly considered in the literature and can be viewed as a type of auction. Hartline and Karlin [10, Chap. 13 ] provided an introduction on this class of problems. The general goal is to determine a price for each item and an allocation of items to consumers in a way that the overall profit of the seller is maximized. However, once the prices are defined, the consumers may behave in several ways. In the literature, there are a variety of models (max/min-buying, rank-buying, max-gain-buying) [1] that try to capture the usual behavior of consumers.
Guruswami et al. [7] formalized one such model, suggested by Aggarwal et al. [1] , defining the envy-free pricing for combinatorial auctions. In the more general setup, each bidder (consumer) is willing to buy a bundle of items. Knowing the valuation of every bundle of items for each bidder, the auctioneer (seller) has to decide on the pricing and on an allocation of the items to the bidders in an envy-free manner, that is, in a way that any bidder is at least as happy with the bundle of items assigned to him (that might even be empty) as with any other bundle of items, considering the prices. The auctioneer's goal is to maximize his profit. Of course, in this general form, there is an issue on the amount of information involved, specifically for the valuations. So it is reasonable to consider, as Guruswami et al., particular cases that avoid this issue.
A well-studied case is the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, in which each bidder is willing (or is allowed) to buy at most one item, and there is an unlimited supply of each item. Guruswami et al. presented a (2 ln n)-approximation for this problem, where n is the number of bidders, and proved that this problem is APX-hard (with each bidder valuation being 1 or 2 for the items of interest). Briest [3] further analyzed the hardness of approximation, considering the uniform budget case, where each bidder equally values all items he is interested in. Assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs, or hardness of refuting random 3CNF formulas, there is no approximation for the uniform budget unit-demand envy-free pricing problem with ratio O(lg ǫ n) for some ǫ > 0. Chen and Deng [4] showed that the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem can be solved in polynomial time if every bidder has positive valuation for at most two items.
More recently, Shioda, Tunçel, and Myklebust [11] described a slightly more general model than the one of Guruswami et al. [7] , and presented a mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation for their model, along with heuristics and valid cuts for their formulation.
Our Results
We present new MIP formulations for the unit-demand envy-free problem that can be adapted also to the model described by Shioda et al. [11] . We compare these new formulations to the one of Shioda et al. through computational experiments that indicate that our new formulations give better results in practice than the other one.
For the computational experiments, we used six different sets of instances, obtained from generators we designed. Leyton-Brown et al. [8] presented the well-known Combinatorial Auction Test Suite (CATS) generator, proposed to provide realistic bidding behavior for five real world situations. See also [5, Chap. 18] . Their generator produces instances for auctions where the bidders are interested in buying a bundle of items. A simple adaptation of CATS for unitdemand auctions does not preserve the economic motivations. So we designed three models to generate different random instances for unit-demand auctions, and we implemented three corresponding generators. Each of the three models has a nice economic interpretation and can be used in other works on unit-demand auctions, such as [9, 11] . We believe these instances generators are a nice contribution by themselves, and we made them available as open-source software at https://github.com/schouery/unit-demand-market-models.
The inapproximability result of Briest [3] indicates that the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem is unlikely to be in APX. In the search for an APX version of the problem, we considered a variant in which the prices are restricted to assume only specific values (that forms a geometric series with ratio 1+ǫ for a fixed ǫ > 0). We prove that any constant approximation for this variant is a constant (depending on ǫ) approximation for the original problem. This implies that this variant is also unlikely to be in APX. Yet, the connection between the two problems seems interesting. At first, one can think that the relation is not surprising but, by changing even a bit the prices of the items, an envy-free allocation may change dramatically, incurring in a big loss of profit. This result however assures that the loss (in terms of optimal values) is within a constant factor.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some notation and describe formally the problem that we address. In Sect. 3, we present our new MIP formulations for the problem and revise the one by Shioda et al. [11] . In Sect. 4, we present the three instances generators and describe the economical motivation behind each one. In Sect. 5, we empirically compare our formulations for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem against the one by Shioda et al. [11] , using sets of instances produced by our generators. In Sect. 6, we consider the variant of the problem with restricted prices and show that this variant is still hard to approximate, that is, if one would find a constant factor approximation for this variant, then this approximation would also have a constant factor for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem. We conclude with some final remarks in Sect. 7.
Model and Notation
We denote by B the set of bidders and by I the set of items.
Definition 1.
A valuation matrix is a non-negative rational matrix v indexed by I × B.
The number v ib represents the value of item i to bidder b.
Definition 2.
A pricing is a non-negative rational vector indexed by I.
Definition 3.
A (unit-demand) allocation is a binary matrix x indexed by I × B, such that, for every bidder b, x ib = 1 for at most one item i.
If x ib = 1, we say that i is sold to b and b receives i. If x ib = 0 for every item i, we say that b receives no item. If x ib = 0 for every bidder b, we say that i is not sold. Note that an allocation is not necessarily a matching, as the same item can be assigned to more than one bidder (each one receives a copy of the item).
Fix a valuation matrix v and a pricing p. The next definitions formalize the concept of an envy-free allocation. In other words, there is no item that would give a bidder a better utility. Now we are ready to state the problem.
Definition 6. The unit-demand envy-free pricing problem consists of, given a valuation matrix v, finding a pricing p and an envy-free allocation x that maximize the auctioneer's profit, which is the sum of the prices of items received by the bidders (considering multiplicities). Fig. 1(a) illustrates an instance of the problem, and Fig. 1(b) shows an envy-free allocation x for the pricing p = (5, 8, 3) , where x 12 = x 13 = x 31 = 1, while all other entries of x are 0. The profit of the auctioneer in this case is 13. Note that this is not the best possible profit, as there is an envy-free allocation for the pricing p = (6, 6, 3) that leads to profit 21 (take x 13 = x 22 = x 24 = x 31 = 1).
Given a valuation matrix v and a pricing p, it is easy to compute an envy-free allocation x p that maximizes the auctioneer's profit. Indeed, for each bidder b, assign to b an item i that maximizes v ib − p i (if that is non-negative), resolving ties by choosing the item with higher price (if ties persist, there is more than one such allocation). Hence, to solve the problem, it is enough to find a pricing p such that p and x p maximize the auctioneer's profit. 
MIP Formulations
Before presenting the formulations, let us denote, for an item i, max{v ib : b ∈ B} as R i and, for a bidder b, max{v ib : i ∈ I} as S b . These definitions will be used for "big-M" inequalities in the formulations presented in this section. We start by presenting the formulation due to Shioda et al. [11] slightly adapted to our problem. Consider a valuation matrix v.
We use the following variables: a binary matrix x indexed by I × B that represents an allocation, a rational vector p indexed by I that represents the pricing and a rational matrixp indexed by I ×B that represents the price paid for item i by each bidder b (that is,p ib = 0 if b does not receive i and p ib = p i otherwise). The formulation, which we name (STM), consists of, finding x, p, andp that
From the formulation (STM) we developed a new and stronger formulation by changing inequalities (1). We call this improved formulation (I), which we present below.
Also, we noticed that inequalities (2) are unnecessary, which led us to another formulation that we call (L) (from the word loose), consisting of the omission of inequalities (2) from formulation (I). That is, it is possible that (L) is a weaker version of (I) in terms of relaxation guarantees.
Studying formulation (L), we developed another formulation with variables x and p as defined before and a rational vector z indexed by B that represents the profit obtained from bidder b (that is, if bidder b receives item i then z b = p i and z b = 0 if b does not receive an item). That is, one can view z as z b = i∈Ip ib . This formulation, which we name (P) (from the word profit ), consists of finding x, p, and z that (P) maximize
As one would expect, (P) is a weaker formulation than (L).
Finally, we present our last formulation that was developed changing the focus from the price paid by a bidder to the utility that a bidder has. We use the following variables: x and p as defined before and a rational vector u indexed by B that represents the utilities of the bidders. The formulation, which we name (U) (from the word utility), consists of, finding x, p, and u that (U) maximize i∈I b∈B
For some MIP formulation (F) and a valuation v, we denote by LR F (v) the value of an optimal solution to the linear relaxation of (F) when the instance is v. Our next result formalizes the relaxation quality guarantees for the formulations presented in this section.
Theorem 7. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, we have that
We do not know if there is an instance v where LR I (v) < LR L (v). Before presenting and discussing the experimental comparison of the these formulations, we describe the instances generators that we used in the computational experiments.
Multi-Item Auctions Test Suites
In this section, we propose three new models to generate different random instances for unit-demand auctions, each of them with a nice economic interpretation.
In these three models, we start by creating a bipartite graph where one side of the bipartition represents the items and the other, the bidders. An edge of this graph represents that the bidder gives a positive value to the corresponding item.
Characteristics Model
The idea is to create a graph where each item has a profile of characteristics and each bidder desires some of these characteristics. In this way, two items that have the same profile are desired by the same bidders, and bidders desire items that do not differ much.
It is natural that an item has a market value, and the valuations for that item (by interested bidders) are concentrated around this value. That is, the valuations for an item should not differ too much, and valuations that are far away from this market value are rare.
An instance of our problem, that is, a valuation matrix, will be represented by a weighted bipartite graph as we describe in the following.
Let m be the number of items, n be the number of bidders, c be the number of the characteristics of an item, o be the number of options for any characteristic, p be the number of options preferred by a bidder for any characteristic, ℓ be the minimum market value of an item, h be the maximum market value of an item, and d be the percentage of deviation used. The set of vertices is I ∪ B and the set of edges E is described below.
For every item i, we have a vector of size c (the characteristics of that item) where every entry is in {1, . . . , o} chosen independent and uniformly at random. For every bidder b, we construct a matrix A ∈ {0, 1} c×p where, for every row, we choose independent and uniformly at random p positions to be set to 1 and o − p positions to be set to 0. For a bidder b and an item i, we have that ib ∈ E if and only if the characteristics of item i coincide with the preferences of bidder b, that is, if the characteristic k of item i has value v then A kv = 1 where A is the matrix of bidder b. See an example of such characteristics and preferences in Fig. 2(a) .
Finally, for every item i, we definep i as the market price of item i, chosen independent and uniformly at random from the interval [ℓ, h]. For every ib in E, we choose v ib from 1.
2 ) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. See Fig. 2(b) .
Neighborhood Model
This model selects the valuations based on a geometric relation. For this, we adapt a random process first introduced by Gilbert [6] for generating a Random Geometric Graph.
The idea is to distribute the items and the bidders in a 1 × 1 square in Q 2 and define the valuations according to the distance between a bidder and an item.
We denote the 1 × 1 square in Q 2 by W . A ball (in Q 2 ) with center at position (x, y) and radius r is denoted by Ball (x, y, r).
We are given the number of items m, the number of bidders n, and a radius r. In order to construct the valuation matrix, we construct a graph G = (I ∪ B, E) such that |I| = m and |B| = n. First we assign a point in W independent and uniformly at random to each item and each (a)
This way, a bidder only gives a positive valuation to items sufficiently close to his location, and the valuation decreases as the distance increases. Two bidders that are at the same distance from an item still can evaluate it differently because they might have different k multipliers.
Popularity Model
In this model we capture the idea that a market might have popular and unpopular items.
Let m be the number of items, n be the number of bidders, e be the number of edges, Q be the maximum quality of an item, and d be a percentage of deviation. We construct the bipartite graph as follows. We start with the empty bipartite graph with parts I and B such that |I| = m and |B| = n. We add edges at random (as described below) until the graph has e edges.
To add an edge, we choose a bidder uniformly at random, and choose an item biased according to its degree. That is, an item i of current degree d i has a weight of d i + 1. (This process, called Preferential Attachment, was already used in the literature by Barabási and Albert [2] to generate graphs with properties that appear in the World Wide Web and in graphs that arise in biology, such as the interactions of the brain cells.)
This way, items that are "popular", when we are adding an edge, have a higher chance to be chosen than "unpopular" items. The final result is a graph with a small number of items of large degree and a large number of items of small degree.
We also use the information of the (final) degree of an item to decide on the valuations. As in the Characteristic Model, an item i has a market pricep i , and we choose the valuation v i,b according to
2 ). But, in contrast to the Characteristic Model, we do not choose the market value uniformly at random in an interval. For each item i, we choose a random quality q i in (0, Q] and we definep i as q i /d i . This way, the market price of an item increases with its quality and decreases with its degree. That is, an item has high desirability if it is "cheap" or has good quality. See Fig. 3 . 
Empirical Results
In this section, we present some empirical results involving the formulations. In our experiments, the new formulations produced better results than (STM), the previously known formulation from the literature. In particular, formulation (L) was the best for small instances, and formulation (U) was the best for large instances (providing a small gap).
We used a computer with two Intel Xeon E5620 2.40 GHz processors, 64GB of RAM running Gentoo Linux 64bit. The MIPs were solved by CPLEX 12.1.0 in single-thread mode, with work memory limited to 4GB. The tests were run using a time limit of one hour of CPU time.
For our tests, we generated six test sets, two for every one of our three models: one with 20 instances with 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, and 300 bidders and items (that we call "small instances") and other with 20 instances with 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500 and 3000 bidders and items (that we call "large instances"). Next we describe the parameters given to the models, and we denote by n the number of items (that is equal to the number of bidders).
For the Characteristic Model, we chose the number of options for a characteristic as o = 8, the number of options prefered by a bidder for any characteristic as p = 7 and the number of characteristics of an item as ⌈log(8/n)/ log(p/o)⌉, the minimum market value of an item as ℓ = 1, the maximum market value of an item as h = 100, and the percentage of deviation as d = 0.25. Thus, the mean degree of the bidders is between 7 and 8. For the Neighborhood Model, we chose the maximum multiplier of a bidder as h = 3, the radius as 8 nπ (in this way, the mean degree of the bidders is near 8) and the scaling factor M = 10. Finally, for the Popularity Model, we chose the number of edges as e = 8n, the maximum quality of an item as Q = 200, and the percentage of deviation as d = 0.25.
Note that all of our instances are sparse, since we believe that in practice dense instances should be rare. That is, we expect that, in a market with many items, each bidder would have positive valuation usually only for a few items.
In our experiments, CPLEX had a better performance with formulation (L) than with any other formulation for small instances. First of all, with (L), CPLEX solved more small instances than with the others formulation. For example, with (STM), CPLEX could not solve (within one hour) any instance of the Popularity Model with 150 or more items. But, with (L), CPLEX solved 14 instances with 150 items and 7 instances with 200 items. Also, Table 2 and Fig. 5 in Appendix C shows that (STM) and (P) provided a mean final gap for small instances that where not solved within one hour that were much worse than those provided by (U), (I) and (L) (at least twice the gap for those formulations). Table 1 in Appendix C.
Even thought formulation (L) was better than the others, we noticed that formulations (U) and (I) were not so far behind from formulation (L) as one can observe in Figs. 4 (in this section) and 5 and Table 2 (in Appendix C).
For large instances, when analyzing the mean final gap for large instances, we conclude that formulation (U) is better than the others. Actually, (U) was able to maintain a really mean small gap even for instances with 3000 bidders and items (the mean final gap was of 2% for the Characteristics model, 3% for the Neighborhood model and 17% for the Popularity model). Figure 6 and Table 3 in Appendix C presents this information in more detail.
We believe that this result is impressive because, theoretically (as proven in Theorem 7), (U) is the weakest of our new formulations (we have no result that compares (U) and (STM)). None the less, (U) is a small formulation when compared with (STM), (I) and (L) and, because of that, the linear relaxation can be computed faster for this formulation (and also for formulation (P)) as one can see in Fig. 7 and Table 4 in Appendix C. Because (P) is a stronger formulation than (U) and they have the same size, we believe that formulation (U) outperformed formulation (P) because of the heuristics used by CPLEX to find good integer solutions.
Hardness of Approximating Geometric Prices
The result of Briest [3] shows how hard is to solve efficiently the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem. While pursuing a variant of the problem for which we could design a polynomial-time algorithm or a constant approximation and inspired by [1] , we considered the case where the prices are restricted to the elements of a geometric series.
Note that this reduces drastically the space of feasible prices and that could potentially lead to solutions far from optimal. This is not the case, as we prove below, the value of an optimal solution of this variant is within a constant factor of the value of an optimal solution of the original problem. Before that, we introduce some useful notation.
Definition 8. For a fixed valuation v we denote max{v ib : i ∈ I, b ∈ B} by V . For a fixed positive rational ǫ, we denote by D 1+ǫ the set {d 0 , d 1 , . . .} where, for every non-negative integer k, d k = V / (1 + ǫ) k .
Definition 9. For positive real numbers n and a set D 1+ǫ , let ⌊n⌋ 1+ǫ = d r where r is the integer such that d r ≤ n < d r−1 .
Remember that in Sect. 2 we defined x p as an envy-free allocation for p that maximizes the auctioneer's profit.
Definition 10. Let sol(p) be the auctioneer's profit for a pricing p and x p . Now, let us first consider that ǫ = 1, that is, the prices are restricted to D 2 . We show that the maximum profit achieved by a pricing restricted by D 2 is at least a constant fraction of the value of an optimal solution for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem. Asp i < p i for every item i, every bidder that receives an item in x p also receives an item in xp. Now, suppose that bidder b receives item i in x p and receives item k in xp. Ifp k ≥p i , then the profit obtained from b is at leastp i > p i /3. So, from now on, we assume thatp k <p i .
Since b receives i and not k in x p , we must have that v ib − p i ≥ v kb − p k . Also, as b receives k and not i in xp, we must have that v kb −p k ≥ v ib −p i , which implies that p k −p k ≥ p i −p i . By the tie-breaking rule used in the definition of x p , the inequality is in fact strict, asp k <p i . Now, suppose thatp k ≤p i /4. Asp i ≤ 2p i /3, we have that
and thusp k > p i /4. Therefore, we conclude that sol(p) ≥ sol(p)/4.
⊓ ⊔
One can prove a similar result for pricings that are restricted to D 1+ǫ , for an arbitrary ǫ > 0. The ratio achieved for such pricings with respect to the optimal value approaches 1 when ǫ goes to 0. This is stated in the next theorem, whose proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 12. Let p be a pricing. For each real ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists a pricingp ǫ consisting of only prices in D 1+ǫ such that sol(p ǫ ) goes to sol(p) as ǫ goes to 0.
⊓ ⊔ A consequence of this result is the following. If there exists a constant factor approximation for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem with prices restricted to D 1+ǫ for some ǫ > 0, then there would exist a constant factor approximation for the unrestricted problem. This is very unlikely, as shown by Briest [3] . So, even for this variant, one cannot hope to find a constant factor approximation without invalidating the hardness assumptions made by Briest. On the other hand, an empirically fast algorithm for solving or approximating this variant of the problem would lead to good approximations for the original problem.
Final Remarks
In this paper, we presented four new MIP formulations for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem along with some empirical results comparing such formulations. Our results show that our formulations are better than the previous formulation from the literature.
Additionally, we presented a new result regarding the hardness of approximating a variant of the problem. The fact that, restricting the prices to be chosen from a geometric series does not make the problem easier to approximate, is really interesting and gives more evidence on how hard it is to theoretically approach this problem.
We also presented three models for generating instances of unit-demand auctions. To our knowledge, these are the first tests suites for unit-demand auctions in the literature. We made the corresponding instances generators available as open-source software.
A Proof of Theorem 7
We prove Theorem 7 using the following lemmas.
Lemma 13. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, LR I (v) ≤ LR STM (v).
Proof. Let (x, p,p) be a feasible solution of (I). We show that (x, p,p) is also feasible for (STM). For that, we only have to prove that, for every bidder b and item k,
From the feasibility of (x, p,p), we have that i∈I (v ib x ib −p ib ) ≥ v kb − p k , so we conclude that
from where the result follows.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 14. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem,
Proof. The result is clear since (L) has a subset of the inequalities of (I). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 15. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem,
Proof. Let (x, p,p) be a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (L). We prove that (x, p, z), where z b = i∈Ip ib , is a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (L) with the same value as (x, p,p). First of all, it is clear that, for every item i, we have that p i ≥ 0 and also, for every bidder b, we have that i∈I x ib ≤ 1. Finally, for every pair (i, b) in I × B, we have that x ib ≥ 0.
Also, for a bidder b, using the fact that z b = i∈Ip ib , it is easy to see that
Now notice that (x, p, z) has the same value in (P) as (x, p,p) has in (L). ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 16. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem,
Proof. Let (x, p, z) be a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (P). We prove that (x, p, u), where u b = i∈I v ib x ib − z b is a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (U) with the same value as (x, p, z).
Because (x, p, z) is feasible for (P), we have that i∈I x ib ≤ 1 for every bidder b, p i ≥ 0 for every item i and, for every pair (i, b) ∈ I × B, we have that x ib ≥ 0.
Since z b ≥ 0 for every bidder b, we conclude that i∈I v ib x ib −u b ≥ 0, and because i∈I v ib x ib − z b ≥ 0, we conclude that u b ≥ 0. Also, we have that
Now, notice that, as S b = max{v ib : i ∈ I} and i∈I x ib ≤ 1, for a bidder b and an item i,
From this, we conclude that
proving that (x, p, u) is feasible in (U). It is easy to see that (x, p, u) has the same value in (U) as (x, p, z) has in (P). ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 7. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem,
Proof. The first part of this proof is given by Lemmas 13, 14, 15, and 16. The second part is shown by our empirical results. All the data can be found at https://github.com/schouery/unit-demand-market-models.
B Proof of Theorem 12
Before its proof, let us restate Theorem 12.
Proof. For every bidder
, where r is a constant greater than 1 that we choose later on. Note that pi (1+ǫ)r <p ǫ i ≤ pi r . As in the proof of Theorem 11, every bidder that receives an item in x p also receives an item in xpǫ , and if bidder b exchanges item i for item k when the pricing changes top ǫ , then
which implies thatp
It can be shown that the maximum on the right side is achieved at r = 1 +
. Using this value of r, we have thatp
As ǫ goes to 0, the chosen value of r goes to 1, and sol(p ǫ ) goes to sol(p). ⊓ ⊔
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